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NOTE
UNGATING SUBURBIA: PROPERTY RIGHTS,
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, AND COMMON
INTEREST COMMUNITIES
Ross Thomas*
Most Americans no longer live in traditionalcommunities. Instead,
they live in suburban subdivisions littered with shopping malls, swimming pools, recreation centers, and private security forces. But improved living conditions, extra services, communal spaces, and
increasedproperty values come at a cost: we are now more segregated
than ever. And in our isolation, the public realm eviscerates, the quality
of public debate deteriorates, and the quality of American citizens
degenerates. Courts and legislatures nonetheless have watched our
communities become more homogenized and Balkanized with little interference, upholding all common interest community regulations deemed
"reasonable."
This Note explores previous solutions to the problem of common
interest community homogenization and Balkanization and argues that
they are inadequate. This Note therefore interrogates the historical
roots of private property rights and contends that private property
secures not only economic liberty, but also fosters the development of
social, moral, and political characteristicsessential to politicalparticipation in a democracy. As a result, this Note asserts that communities
have a fundamental right to be reasonably heterogeneous because diverse communities foster the social, moral, and political development of
democratic citizens. This Note then proposes an alternative solution to
problematic CIC regulations by combining the federalist concept of
"laboratoriesof democracy" with republican "civic virtue," a solution
that addresses both federalist and republican concerns regardingdemocratic legitimacy. This Note concludes with the view that when courts
analyze CIC restrictions, they should consider whether or not a CIC restriction unreasonably interferes with a community's right to be
heterogeneous.
* J.D. candidate, Cornell Law School, 2013; B.A., Columbia University, 2009. 1 am
grateful for the guidance of Cornell Law School professors Thomas McSweeney, Aziz Rana,
and Laura Underkuffler, the insightful critiques of Chris Dickson and Antonio Haynes, and the
support of my parents, Laurie and George Thomas.
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INTRODUCTION

Common interest communities' (CICs) have increasingly Balkanized and homogenized American neighborhoods. As of 2011, approximately 62.3 million Americans live in common interest communities. 2
Walled off from the outside world by private security guards, gates, and
even moats, Americans isolate themselves in a private suburbia sprinkled
with their own shopping malls and recreational facilities.3 CICs are gov-

I Common interest communities are defined by shared property, by restrictions built
into their deeds limiting the uses of property, and by a mandatory homeowners' association
that administers the property and enforces the restrictions on its use. Stephen E. Barton &
Carol J. Silverman, History and Structure of the Common Interest Community, in COMMON
INTEREST COMMUNflmES: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 3, 3 (Stephen E.

Barton & Carol J. Silverman, eds., 1994).
2 This number has more than doubled since 1990 when only 29.6 million Americans
lived in CICs. Cmty. Ass'n. Inst., Industry Data: National Statistics, http://www.caionline.
org/info/researchlPages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 2, 2012).
3 See David J. Kennedy, Residential Associations as State Actors: Regulating the Impact of Gated Communities on Nonmembers, 105 YALE L.J. 761, 765-66 (1995); Robert B.
Reich, Secession of the Successful, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Jan. 20, 1991, http://www.nytimes.

com/I 991/01/20/magazine/secession-of-the-successful.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm;
MICKEY KAus, THE END

01F

EQUALrIY, 17 (1995) ("What really bothers liberals about Ameri-
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erned by "covenants, conditions, and restrictions" 4 (CC&Rs) and other
regulations promulgated by the CIC's governing board-called a homeowners' association (HOA). 5 Few legal restrictions govern these private
regulations. Under federal law, CICs can be created on the basis of anything other than race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin,
or handicap of person. 6 Courts tend to uphold all other reasonable restrictions. 7 These limited legal restrictions have consequently contributed to the "skyboxification of American life," 8 as an increasing number
of Americans flee to the safety of these homogenous communities. 9
By definition, all communities exclude non-members; however,
CIC regulations are especially problematic because they result in legally
enforced, semi-permanent land restrictions. CICs are therefore distinct
from other forms of community organization in two ways. First, unlike
de facto community organization, CIC regulations bear the imprimatur of
the state. 10 Second, CICs are more permanent because they regulate real
property, which imposes duties and obligations on the land regardless of
can society? ... Is it that the wealthiest 20 or 30 percent of Americans are 'succeeding,' as
Robert Reich puts it, into separate, often self-sufficient suburbs, where they rarely even meet
members of non-wealthy classes, except in the latter's role as receptionists and repairmen?
And is it the gnawing sense that, in their isolation, these richer Americans not only are passing
on their advantages to their children, but are coming to think that those advantages are deserved, that they and their children are, at bottom, not just better off but better?").
4 "Conditions covenants and restrictions set out restrictions on what owners can and
cannot do with their own property . . . They typically govern dwelling units, even if the units
themselves are individually owned . . . Not all details will be set out in the CC&R. Some will
be set by the homeowners association who use the authority granted by the CC&R. But
CC&Rs tend to give the association very little flexibility." See Barton & Silverman, supra
note 1, at 6.
5 See EVAN McKENZIE, BEYOND PRIvATOPIA: RETi-HINKING RESIDEN'IAIL PRIVATE GovERNMENT 114-19 (2011).

See Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2006).
7 See Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy: Residential Associations
and Community, 75 CORNEi. L. REV. 1, 6 (1989).
8 Michael J. Sandel, Op-Ed., If I Were President. . ., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2011, http://
6

www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/08/21/opinion/sunday/20110821
KornbluthPresident.
html [hereinafter Sandel, Op-Ed] ("Not long ago, the ballpark was a place where C.E.O.'s and
mailroom clerks sat side by side, and everyone got wet when it rained. Today, most stadiums

have corporate skyboxes, which cosset the privileged in air-conditioned suites, far removed
from the crowd below. Something similar has happened throughout our society. The affluent
retreat from public schools, the military, and other public institutions, leaving fewer and fewer
class-mixing places. Rich and poor increasingly live separate lives."). See also MICHAIL J.
SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT'S THE' RIGHT THING 10 Do? 266 (2009) [hereinafter SANDEL, JuSTIcE]

("A similar trend leads to the succession by the privileged from other public institutions and
facilities. Private health clubs replace municipal recreation centers and swimming pools. Upscale residential communities hire private security guards and rely less on public police protection. A second or third car removes the need to rely on public transportation. And so on. The
affluent secede from public places and services, leaving them to those who can't afford anything else.").
9 See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 764-67.

10 See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
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the owner. In other words, because courts enforce property restrictions,
CICs legally and permanently alter the formation of community life.
Another problematic aspect of CICs is that they influence the development of residential life. Although Americans belong to numerous and
overlapping communities," residential communities furnish a fundamental mediating structure between private and public life.1 2 Further, because CICs increase privatized spaces, CICs decrease the number and
quality of traditionally public spheres.1 3 Thus, by excluding or marginalizing individuals from residential communities, CICs not only effectively
prohibit excluded members from meaningfully participating in civic life,
they also exacerbate civic life's demise.14
Homogenized residential associations also limit the social and political development of its internal group members because diversity promotes better learning outcomes, breaks down stereotypes, and prepares
citizens for the challenges of an undeniably heterogeneous society.15
Moreover, without exposure to diverse viewpoints, CIC residents cannot
envision the common good. And as neighborhoods become more Balkanized, its isolated members even fail to appreciate why democratic
politics should care about the common good. Hence, CICs move democracy away from its deliberative ideal' 6 and deprives its residents of
meaningful political participation.

I1 See

ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVIu-L,

DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 114 (Phillips Bradley ed.,

Vol. II Vintage Books 1945) (1840) ("Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions constantly form associations. They have not only commercial and manufacturing companies, in which all take part, but associations of a thousand other kinds . . . Wherever at the head
of some new undertaking you see the Government in France, or a man of rank in England, in
the United States you will be sure to find an association.").
12 See Stephen E. Barton & Carol J. Silverman, Shared Premises: Community and Conflict in the Common Interest Development, in COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIns: PRIVATE
GOVERNMEN[S AND THE PUBIiC INTEREST 132 (Stephen E. Barton & Carol J. Silverman, eds.,

1994) ("Neighborhood organizations are the most visible means by which people get together
to engage in public action . . . ."); Jonathan R. Macey, Packaged Preferences and the Institutional Transformation of Interests, 61 U. Cm. L. RV. 1443, 1470 (1994) ("The reality is that

mediating institutions provide a forum through which the self-interest of members can be
amplified and directed. Indeed, a primary reason why these mediating institutions were
formed in the first place was to provide a vehicle through which the self-interest of similarly
situated individuals can find political expression in an effective, cost-effective manner.").
13 See SANDEL, JusTIcE, supra note 8, at 265-68.
14 See Alexander, supra note 7, at 5.

15 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331-32 (2003).
16 See JOSHUA COHEN, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in PHILOSOPHY, PoLITiCs, DEMOCRACY 16, 25 (2009) ("[T]he aim of ideal deliberation is to secure agreement among

all who are committed to free deliberation among equals .

. .

. While no one is indifferent to

his/her own good, everyone also seeks to arrive at decisions that are acceptable to all who
share the commitment to deliberation.").
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Although numerous scholars present solutions to problematic CIC
regulations,' 7 none of their solutions adequately address the homogenization or Balkanization problem. Part I of this Note contextualizes this
dilemma. Part II of this Note proposes that a historical analysis of property rights will suggest a more workable solution to problematic CIC
restrictions. A historical analysis demonstrates why property rights are
important and analyzes previous solutions to avoid re-inventing the
wheel. This Note further contends that the nation's founders expressed a
universal interest in the interaction between property rights and meaningful political participation. As such, any solution to CIC restrictions
should keep this universal interest in mind. Further, because the debate
between pluralism and communitarianism18 dates back to the founding
debates between federalist and republican political philosophies, a solution incorporating both federalist and republican theories may help address problematic CIC restrictions.
Part III of this Note continues the use of a historical analysis to
suggest why current solutions have failed to remedy the homogenization
and Balkanization problem. For example, scholars who advocate a state
action solution1 9 do not adequately address the issue because they do not
engage with both federalist pluralism and republican communitarianism-both of which are necessary to address the consequences to political participation. Gregory Alexander, who argued that the current
reasonableness standard of review was adequate, 20 did not engage with
the underlying rationale for property rights, a system devised to protect
self-rule.
Part IV then uses the historical analysis to suggest an alternative
solution. It argues that combining the federalist concept of "laboratories
of democracy" with a republican emphasis on civic virtue better addresses federalist and republican concerns with meaningful political participation. It contends that communities should be, and have a right to
be, reasonably heterogeneous because diverse laboratories of democracy
better approximate the deliberative ideal. This Note concludes with the
17 See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 3 (applying state-action doctrine); Alexander, supra
note 7 (applying a reasonableness standard of review); Lisa J. Chadderdon, Note, No Political

Speech Allowed: Common Interest Developments, Homeowners Associations, and Restrictions

on Free Speech, 21 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 233 (2006) (applying state-action doctrine); Paula
A. Franzese, Does It Take A Village? Privatization, Patterns of Restrictiveness and the Demise

of Community, 47 Viu . L. Rnv. 553 (2002) (suggesting the need for more legislative
guidelines).
18 Pluralist theorists believe that individuals associate with each other only to achieve
specific ends coincidentally shared. Communitarian theorists believe that group activity and
individuality are simultaneously present aspects of the human personality, or self. Alexander,
supra note 7, at 2-3.
19 See, e.g., Chadderdon, supra note 17; Kennedy, supra note 3.
20 See Alexander, supra note 7, at 58-59.
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view that when courts analyze CIC restrictions, they should consider
whether or not the CIC restriction unreasonably interferes with a community's right to be heterogeneous under a reasonableness standard of
review.
I.

A.

BACKGROUND

Conceptualizing the Problem

Over the last two decades, common interest communities have proliferated throughout America. 2 1 Although CICs existed earlier, 22 early
CICs were primarily conclaves for the wealthy. 23 New developments
have, however, made CICs accessible to people from varying socio-economic backgrounds. 24 As a result, CICs not only reflect different economic classeS25 but also diverse interests such as religious affiliations, 26
retirement communities, 27 and families who just cannot get enough of
Disney World. 2 8
Ostensibly, CICs innocuously generate a greater sense of commu29
nity. Nevertheless, they exist to exclude. 30 For example, a New Jersey
CIC precluded Tier 3 sex offenders from residing in the development. 3 '
Similarly, an Illinois CIC prevented property owners from running their
business out of their homes. 32 A California CIC told a condominium
21 See McKENZIE, supra note 5, at 1-2.

22 For a fuller development on the history of CICs see Marc A. Weiss & John W. Watts,
Community Builders and Community Associations: The Role of Real Estate Developers in
Private Residential Governance, in REsioNIIAL, COMMUNrry ASSOCIATIONS: PRIVATE GovERNMENTS IN THE INTERGOVIRNMENTIAL Sysnrim? 95, 95 (1989).
23 See McKENzm, supra note 5, at 18.
24 Id.

25 See Reich, supra note 3.

26 Although overt exclusion on the basis of religion would be illegal under the Federal
Fair Housing Act, CC&Rs may be structured to create restrictions that result in de facto religious exclusion. For example, the town of Ave Maria limits access to birth control and forbids
the sale of pornography. See Charles E. Rice, The Controversy Behind Monaghan's Ave Maria Town "Scheme," FREE REPUI3UC (Feb. 13, 2010, 10:10 AM), http://www.freerepublic.

com/focus/f-religion/2450566/posts. But see Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2006).
27 The Federal Fair Housing Act exempts "housing for older persons" from some of its
prohibitions. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1).
28 Celebration, a community founded by the Walt Disney Company, took over eight
years to plan and design. During this time Disney obtained input from various sources to
determine Celebration's focus: health, education, technology, place, and community. See Cornerstones, CELEIBRATION, http://www.celebration.fl.us/town-info/cornerstones/

(last visited

Apr. 1, 2012).
29 See Franzese, supra note 17, at 553.
30 Jeremy Waldron, Community and Property-ForThose Who Have Neither, 10 THEORETCAL INQ. L. 161, 161 (2009).

31 See Mulligan v. Panther Valley Prop. Owners Ass'n., 766 A.2d 1186, 1189 (N.J. App.
Div. 2001).
32 See Amoco Realty Co. v. Montalbano, 478 N.E.2d 860, 863 (1ll. App. Ct. 1985) (upholding restriction against use of property for business purposes). Although this restriction
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owner that she would either have to ditch her beloved pet cat or live
elsewhere. 3 3 CICs could also theoretically ban individuals who identify
as queer 34 or (gasp!) lawyers.35
The problem with CIC restrictions is two-fold. First, homogenous
communities deprive some members of our political community from
any meaningful opportunity to participate in civic life. 3 6 As Judge Weffing pointed out in Mulligan v. Panther Valley Prop. Owners Ass'n, although sex offenders do not constitute a protected group, this does not
inevitably lead to the conclusion that CICs can entirely exclude non-protected groups from private life.3 7 In other words, all people, not simply
individuals within a predetermined protected class, should have the opportunity to participate in some residential communities. 38
Moreover, because residential associations furnish a fundamental
mediating structure between private and public life, 39 CICS may effectively prohibit excluded members from any meaningful participation in
civic life. 40 As private spaces for communal interaction increase, the
number and quality of public spheres decrease. 4 1 Many CICs now have
their own police forces, fire departments, parks, playgrounds, swimming
pools, tennis courts, and community centers. 4 2 When CIC members no
longer depend on these government services, they become less willing to
applies to activities rather than people, restrictions that ban specific activities necessarily result
in restrictions that limit the types of people willing to live in the community.
33 See Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass'n., 878 P.2d 1275, 1278-79 (Cal. 1994).
Here, the restriction on cats and dogs was actually in the CC&R, but one could argue that a
HOA could have reasonably created this type of restriction.
34 Although the proper standard to be applied to sexual minorities is open to debate,
under a rational basis review, these types of enforcements would be upheld. See Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Instead the Court simply describes petitioners' conduct as 'an exercise of their liberty'-which it undoubtedly is-and proceeds to apply
an unheard-of form of rational-basis review that will have far-reaching implications beyond
this case.").
35 Property restrictions traditionally needed to "touch and concern" the land. However,
because the law of contracts is also implicated, CIC restrictions avoid such complications and
therefore can reach groups. See Uriel Reichman, Residential Private Governments: An Introductory Survey, 43 U. Cm. L. Rv. 253, 279-80 (1976).
36 See Alexander, supra note 7, at 55.

37 Mulligan v. Panther Valley Prop. Owners Ass'n., 766 A.2d 1186, 1193 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2001) ("It does not necessarily follow, however, that large segments of the State
could entirely close their doors to such individuals, confining them to a narrow corridor and
thus perhaps exposing those within that remaining corridor to a greater risk of harm than they
might otherwise have had to confront.").
38 Although a specific CIC is a minority, CICs as a whole are increasingly becoming the
norm. If all CICs ban sex offenders, sex offenders have fewer places to live. Combined with
the fact that CICs tend to be more affluent, CIC restrictions may force excluded individuals to
live in undesirable neighborhoods.
39
40
41
42

See
See
See
See

Macey, supra note 12.
Alexander, supra note 7, at 5.
SANDE., Jusiic, supra note 8, at 265-68.
Kennedy, supra note 3.
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support public services and spaces with their tax dollars. 43 Excluded
members are therefore not only deprived of the specific private institutions within a CIC, but public institutions as well. 4 4 Thus, Balkanized
communities exclude individuals from meaningful participation in civic
life because they eviscerate the substance of the public realm. 45
Second, diversity matters for internal members of the community
because it promotes better learning outcomes, breaks down stereotypes,
and prepares citizens for the challenges of an undeniably heterogeneous
society. 46 Heterogeneity also avoids concentrating the passions,
prejudices, and local interests 47 within communities, which ultimately
lead to problems associated with the psychological concept of
groupthink. 4 8 The problem is, therefore, not only that CIC restrictions
could result in de jure ghettoization of, for example, queer people or
lawyers, but also that members inside a CIC may never have the opportunity to meet or interact with a queer person or a lawyer, drastically limiting their social and political development.
Moreover, without exposure to diverse viewpoints, homogenized
and Balkanized CICs move democracy away from its deliberative ideal.
Under a deliberative theory of democracy, democracy requires citizens to
deliberate and offer rationales that appeal to the common good. 49 Homogeneous CICs blind their members to the common good because it deprives members of interactions with individuals outside their increasingly
myopic milieu. Balkanized communities also create incentives to eschew the common good because each residential association seeks to
benefit only themselves under a system of interest-group pluralism.
Thus, homogenized and Balkanized CICs potentially deprive their members of meaningful participation in political life as political discourse
degenerates into skirmishes over "what's good for me" rather than
"what's good for us."
B.

How CICs Derive Legal Authority

Common interest communities derive their coercive power from the
law of servitude and contracts5 0 and may be organized as condominiums,
43 See SANDEL, JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 267.

44 Id.
45 See id.

46 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331-34.
47 See MARCHrrrE CHUTE, THiE FIRsr LBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE RIGHT To VOTE IN

AMERICA, 1619-1850, 255 (1969) (quoting Ben Franklin on the wisdom of homogenous
groups).
48 See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go To Extremes, 110 YALE

L.J. 71, 114 (2000).
49 See COHEN, supra note 16.
50 See Reichman, supra note 35, at 279.
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cooperatives, or planned developments.5 1 In a typical planned community, a developer begins with a large tract of land and imposes specific
CC&Rs on the land before subdividing and selling the land into individual lots. 5 2 Additionally, individual property deeds provide that the powers described in CC&Rs will be vested in a homeowners' association,5 3
and that the HOA will have the power to enforce, amend, and create
additional obligations. 54 HOA powers are derived from a property
owner's freedom of contract and law of servitude.5 5 Purchasers voluntarily agree to be bound by CC&Rs and the possibility that the HOA may
amend or add restrictions in the future. 56 Thus, by voluntarily agreeing
to accept servitudes that "run with the land" and bind subsequent purchasers, HOAs legally exercise coercive power over their residents. 57
Property owners in CICs give up certain property rights in exchange
for improved living conditions, extra services, communal spaces, and increased property values.5 8 However, tension arises in two situations: 5 9
Under the first scenario, property owners may not wish to abide by
CC&Rs or amended HOA regulations and ask courts to protect them
from the consequences of their voluntary agreements. 60 In the second
situation, property owners voluntarily agree to abide by CIC restrictions,
but the restrictions interfere with a fundamental value of the external
community. 6' Members of the external community may then seek to
prevent the private agreement from being enforced through adjudication
or legislation. 62 Although the external community and contract breakers
both gain substantial liberty when restrictions are struck down, these
rules impinge on the liberty of developers and contract-abiding property
5 I For the purposes of this Note, the differences between these forms are unimportant.
This Note, instead, focuses on their shared characteristics-shared property, restrictions built
into their deeds limiting the uses of property, and a mandatory homeowners' association that
administers the property and enforces the restrictions on its use.
52 See McKENZIm, supra note 5, at 10-11.

53 See Barton & Silverman, supra note 1, at 6.
54 See Reichman, supra note 35, at 279-80.
55 See id.
56 See id.
57 See id.
58 See id at 292; Wayne S. Hyatt, Common Interest Communities: Evolution and
Reinvention, 31 J. MARSHAL. L. REv. 303, 318 (1998).

59 Hyatt has identified the eight main criticisms of CICs. However, this note focuses
only on the first three: (1) the current concepts do not advance the idea of communities; (2)
CICs are coercive, rather than voluntary; (3) CICs create a tension between the group and the
individual. This Note considers these three critiques so interrelated that to distinguish between
them is unnecessary. Hyatt, supra note 58, at 312-14.
60 See, e.g., Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass'n., 878 P.2d 1275 (Cal. 1994);
Rocek v. Markowitz, 492 So. 2d 460 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
61 See Hyatt, supra note 58, at 341-42.

62 See id; see, e.g., Mulligan v. Panther Valley Prop. Owners Ass'n., 766 A.2d 1186
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
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owners. 63 Therefore, American property law has always been concerned
with striking a balance between these two freedoms. 64
C.

Current Solutions and Why They Are Unsatisfactory

Scholars have proposed different solutions to negotiate between the
rights of the individual and the rights of the community. For example,
some scholars argue that CICs advance pluralist values. 65 Paula A.
Franzese argues that CICs have the potential to enhance political participation through the collective articulation of individual preferences. 66
Therefore, rather than subjecting CICs to enhanced judicial scrutiny,
which creates animosity within the community, legislatures should develop more structural guidelines. 67 Franzese's pluralist rationale, nevertheless, does not adequately address the problem of homogenization
because her solution concerns developing internal community standards
rather than external ones. 68
Other scholars argue that CICs are private governments, perform
government functions, or bear a sufficiently close nexus to the State 69
and therefore constitutional protections should apply to CIC regulations
under the state action doctrine. 70 This solution, however, fails to adequately address the homogenization and Balkanization problem because
constitutional provisions may be both under- and over-inclusive. Constitutional provisions are under-inclusive because the Supreme Court has
63 Hyatt, supra note 58, at 313 ("At the root of this theme is society's preoccupation with
the individual's 'rights' and society's disregard for the rights of the group.").

64 See Alexander, supra note 7, at 3 ("The central problem with which much recent
communitarian theory struggles is how the polity may harmonize the dual aspects-social and
individual-of the self, encouraging group life without sacrificing individual identity. The polity's harmonizing responsibility requires that it recognize the principle of group autonomy, but
not in the form defined by pluralist theory.").
65 See, e.g., Franzese, supra note 17, at 592.
66 See id. at 592-93.

67 See id. at 593 ("Reinvention of the common interest community requires a comprehensive, nationwide rethinking of association goals and missions. Community associations

must be redefined so that their central agenda is cast in terms of the very conscious resolve to
rebuild withering social bonds. Careful, deliberate and sustained attention must be given to the
arduous task of finding ways to guide community engagement so that in time a strong social
fabric will become the principal determinant of compatible harmonious land use and behavior
that is respectful of the rights of others.").
68 See id. at 591 ("Instead of imposing an exhaustive litany of covenants, conditions and
restrictions from the start, the declaration should contain only those few rules deemed essential
to promoting the community's basic structure and well-being. The declaration should empower associations to carefully and deliberately supplement its skeletal frame with appropriate
regulations on an as-needed basis. Residents' involvement in the augmentation process should
be actively solicited and encouraged, as should their entitlement to participate in subsequent
modification and amendment procedures.").
69 See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 3, at 767-68; Chadderon, supra note 17, at 242.
70 See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 778.
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recognized only a few protected groups. 7' Moreover, because equal protection requires an intentional actor, only the most egregious forms of
CIC exclusion will be remedied. 7 2 Constitutional provisions may be
over-inclusive because certain desirable regulations may be forbidden,
undermining any rational basis for CICs. 7 3
In Dilemmas of Group Autonomy: Residential Associations and
Community, Alexander reorients this debate by discussing both communitarism and pluralism rationales. 74 Pluralists and communitarians
both recognize the legitimacy of inalienable entitlements, but disagree
about which entitlements should be inalienable. 75 Pluralists usually find
racially exclusionary covenants to be one area where legal intervention is
justified because racially exclusionary covenants diminish rather than enhance economic efficiency.7 6 Under a pluralist theory, although people
would be willing to pay more to prevent racially discriminatory restrictions, the prohibitive transactional costs associated with organizing a
large and dissociated group makes this transaction impossible.7 7
71 See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (race); Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356 (1886) (race, color, or national origin); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (gender); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (sexual orientation).
72 See DEAN SPADE, NORMAL LiFE: ADMINISTRATIVE VIOLENCE, CRFICAL TRANS PoLIr-

ICS, AND THE LIMns oF LAw 84 (2011) ("Discrimination law primarily conceptualizes the

harm of racism through the perpetrator/victim dyad, imagining that the fundamental scene is
that of a perpetrator who irrationally hates people on the basis of their race and fires or denies
service to or beats or kills the victim based on that hatred. The law's adoption of this conception of racism does several things that make it ineffective at eradicating racism and help it
contribute to obscuring the actual operations of racism."). The problem isn't that CICs are
explicitly racist, theophobic, ableist, xenophobic, transphobic, or homophobic. The problem
operates on a more systemic and nebulous level. For example, although CICs cannot explicitly
prohibit Hispanics from living in their gated community, specific restrictions may make it
unlikely that Hispanics will live there. The goal, therefore, is to think more broadly about the
causes of and solutions to exclusion without assigning blame-something currently unimaginable and arguably undesirable under an application of the Fourteenth Amendment.
73 For example, we might want to allow CICs to ban firearms because the community is
arguably less safe when its residents carry handguns. If the state action doctrine applied, gun
ownership limitations may be deemed unconstitutional. See MacDonald v. City of Chicago,
130 S.Ct 3020, 3050 (2010).
74 See Alexander, supra note 7, at 2-3.
75 See id. at 3-4.

76 See id. at 29 ("Public choice theorists define social welfare in economic (i.e., wealthmaximizing), rather than political terms, although many of these writers see the two aspects of
social welfare as mutually reinforcing."). To be sure, pluralism, and its cognate public-choice
theory, are not always rationalized in such instrumental terms. Some pluralists make noninstrumental (i.e. liberty) arguments. Id. at 2. However, as Alexander and other scholars have
noted, the economic efficiency rationale dovetails perfectly with arguments about economic
liberty. Id. at 2. See also, Reichman, supra note 35, at 284 ("Thus, those who regard economic freedom as the primary goal would largely oppose government intervention and would
disapprove of protecting anyone from the consequences of property transactions.").
77 See Reichman, supra note 35, at 283 ("But to argue as they do that (a) if certain
transactions were allowed many people would be upset and (b) thus would be willing to pay
more money to the seller for not consummating the deal than he could have otherwise ob-
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The Court in Shelley v. Kraemer struck down these types of exclusionary entitlements.7 8 Congress further added that exclusionary entitlements on the basis of religion, sex, familial status, national origin, or
handicap status are also impermissible.7 9 Under a communitarian theory,
however, entitlements could be extended to protect currently unprotected
groups because communitarians support stronger group autonomy.80 As
a result, depending on how the pluralist or communitarian scholar balances competing fundamental values or conceptualizes the fundamental
normative value, they will disagree about the limitations of judicial interference when analyzing controversial CIC restrictions.
After discussing both communitarianism and pluralism, Alexander
argues that the current judicial reasonableness review strikes the appropriate balance between these competing values.8 1 The current reasonableness standard of review, however, does not adequately protect against
community encroachments because reasonableness is highly malleable
and does not encompass external community values. 82 Alexander's reasonableness standard of review, without clearer indicia of reasonableness, fails to answer the homogenization and Balkanization challenge
because reasonableness provides no guidance on how CIC regulations
tained, but that (c) prohibitive transaction costs make such an outbidding procedure impossible
and therefore (d) the law invalidates these types of transactions-seems not only highly artificial but without any foundation in law.") (internal citations omitted). Put another way, when
someone cannot sell land to an entire race of people, the land is less alienable. Because the
land is less alienable, it is less valuable because the number of potential buyers significantly
decreases. Rational people would see this happening and be willing to pay the people writing
this contract to prevent them from executing a deal that will make the land inalienable. However, finding this group of people and negotiating the costs is prohibitive. Thus, the transaction costs are too high to envision such a scenario, so the law steps in.
78 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Nevertheless, it seems more plausible that the
Court struck down the racially restrictive covenant here because the ruling was "essential to
ensure human well-being, dignity and freedom." Reichman, supra note 35, at 283.
79 See Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601, 3602 (2006).
80 See Alexander, supra note 7, at 2-3. To be sure, a communitarian theory could be
used to justify racially exclusive covenants. However, the argument is not that communitarian
theory is automatically better for excluded groups, but rather that communitarian theory could
be used to encourage inclusion because the theory does not advocate for strong personal autonomy, which would prohibit the community from interfering with an individual's property
rights even to protect a liberty interest of the external community.
81 See id. at 60.
82 Although courts have argued that they need to encompass external community values,
given the nature of judicial proceedings it is hard to argue that without a clearer standard of
what the external community standards are, a court will be able to conduct a review of anything other than internal reasonableness. See, e.g., Mulligan v. Panther Valley Prop. Owners
Ass'n., 766 A.2d 1186 (upholding a restrictions against Tier 3 sex offenders because the record was insufficient to establish how this related to external standards). But see Alexander,
supra note 7, at 6 ("Courts have tended substantively to review these rules, applying a standard
of reasonableness that requires the rules of the group to conform not only to the association's
own internal values but to external values as well-i.e., values that, in the court's judgment,
are widely shared throughout the rest of the polity.").
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affect democratic participation. The current reasonableness standard of
review, therefore, does not solve the problem.

II.
A.

A

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

Why is a HistoricalAnalysis Helpful?

Because none of the solutions, discussed above, adequately address
the Balkanization and homogenization dilemma, a historical analysis
may suggest a more workable solution. A historical analysis is useful
when evaluating problematic CIC restrictions for two main reasons: first,
a historical analysis connects universal interests with more specialized or
novel issues 83 and, second, current legal debates include "juridical notions and theories which have descended, and been multiplied from generation to generation." 84
Law, as an intellectual endeavor, becomes meaningless unless the
scholar can connect his or her esoteric interest, which by definition concerns very few people, with universal subjects.85 A historical analysis
illuminates universal human interests and demonstrates how seemingly
esoteric interests have repeatedly been connected to the universal. 86 According to Holmes, universal interests give the legal mind a sense of
purpose.8 7 Here, grounding a discussion of CIC restrictions in history
highlights some fundamental and universal questions: what is the relationship between the government and its citizens? How does the government create a meaningful political life? What structures best encourage
citizen engagement and participation?
Historical consciousness also protects against the "false light of
universality and originality" because historical study severs continuity
from anomaly.8 8 Thus, history not only illuminates the truly universal,
but also prevents the scholar from losing sight of his or her individual
83 See FRIEDRICH KARL VON SAVIGNY,

OF

THE VOCArION OF OUR AGE FOR LuGISIATION

AND JURISPRUDENCE 135 (Abraham Hayward trans., Arno Press Inc., 2d ed. 1975) (1831)
(arguing that we lose sight of our individual connection with the great entirety of the world
without knowledge of history).
84 Id. at 131.

85 See id. at 135 ("Yet we meet with people daily who hold their juridical notions and
opinions to be the offspring of pure reason, for no earthly reason but because they are ignorant
of their origin.").
86 See id.
87 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. Riy. 457, 478 (1897) ("The

remoter and more general aspects of the law are those which give it universal interest. It is
through them that you not only become a great master in your calling, but connect your subject
with the universe and catch an echo of the infinite, a glimpse of its unfathomable process, a
hint of the universal law.").
88 See SAVIGNY, supra note 83, at 134 ("The historical spirit, too, is the only protection

against a species of self-delusion, which is ever and anon reviving in particular men, as well as
in whole nations and ages; namely, the holding that which is peculiar to ourselves to be common to human nature in general.").
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connection with the world. 89 Any solution to CIC restrictions that ignores history may lose sight of why anyone should care about property
rights or CICs.
Second, whether consciously or not, current legal debates include
"juridical notions and theories which have descended, and been multiplied from generation to generation."9 0 All legal discussions contain
words, phrases, and concepts that are essential to a common language for
legal scholarship. 9 1 Moreover, it is impossible to eliminate the historical
foundations from our current legal structures because judges and legislators build with these tools and operate within this framework. 92 In other
words, the scholar ignores the past at his or her own peril. 93
Here, both pluralist and communitarian theorists derive their rationales from long-standing debates over private property systems. The
founders wanted to establish a private property system but could not
agree on a singular rationale. 94 As a result, the founders' competing visions of the "good society" clashed when they deliberated fundamental
questions such as property rights and the right to vote. These concerns
were present throughout this country's history and appear in contemporary constitutional debates, judicial opinions, and legislative decisions.
Thus, the modem debate not only reflects debates that occurred over two
hundred years ago, it also adopts similar words, phrases, and concepts
that make older debates comprehensible. 9 5 To meaningfully engage in
this discussion, it is therefore helpful to interrogate the historical roots of
private property rights.
B.

History?

Before proceeding into a discussion of what history "reveals," it is
important to state at the outset that there is no authoritative historical
narrative. Historical narratives-especially those concerning the found89
90
91
92

See id.
Id. at 131.
See id.
See id. at 131-32; see also Holmes, supra note 87, at 478 ("Read the works of the
great German jurists, and see how much more the world is governed to-day by Kant than by

Bonaparte.").
93 See SAVIGNY, supra note 83, at 131-33; Holmes, supra note 87, at 478.
94 Compare Eric Foner, Radical Individualism in America: Revolution to Civil War,
LrrERATURE OF LIBERTY, JULY-SEptr. 1978, at II ("Jeffersonianism rested, therefore, on a com-

mitment to ownership of landed property as the basis of independence."), with Thomas Ross,
Taking Takings Seriously, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 1591, 1593-95 ("Individual property was justified by [Locke's] labor theory: when one mixed one's labor with God's gift the resulting value
could be attributed mostly to one's labor .. . . 'It is very clear that the founders shared Locke's
and Blackstone's affection for private property . . . .')
VATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OiF EMINENr DOMAIN

95 See SAVIGNY, supra note 83, at 131-32.

(quoting R. EusrrmN, TAKINGS: PRI26-27 (1985)).
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ing-are highly contested. 96 However, previous scholars, who rely on a
pluralist rationale, have focused primarily on one interpretation of the
history-a history where the founders were classical liberals and classical liberalism was the sole theoretical influence in the American legal
and political tradition.97 These legal scholars are misguided because the
history is contestable and complicated. 9 8 Thus, treating classical liberalism as the only theory in the American political tradition is overly simplistic in attempting to create an authoritative history. Because there is
no authoritative history, this Note seeks to point out a different historiography, one that is useful when contemplating a solution to problematic

CIC restrictions.
1. Property Rights and Political Participation
The Founders inherited an intellectual tradition that connected private property rights to political participation. 99 The concept of owning
property as a voting requirement was common to both the colonists and
the Britons. 00 The British and colonial ruling classes believed that property owners "were and should remain the backbone of state and society
because they were the repository of virtues not found in other classes."'o
The seventeenth-century ruling class also believed that the relatively
poor who lacked education and standing in the community could not develop an active interest in the state's affairs.102
For example, Blackstone adhered to Montesquieu's idea that all inhabitants should be permitted to vote "except such as are in so mean a
situation as to be deemed to have no will of their own" and incorporated
this notion into his Commentaries on the Laws of England.10 3 Henry
Ireton, a conservative spokesman during the Putney Debates, argued that
persons who did not have a fixed interest in the country should not be
96 See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L.

REV. 204, 219 (1980).
97 See MARC STEARS, DEMANDING DIMOCRACY: AMERICAN RADICAL S IN SEARCH OF A

NEw PoIrrics 138 (2010) ("Literary commentators such as Lionel Trilling noted that 'liberalism is not only the dominant but even the sole intellectual tradition' in the United States.
Historians also adopted the argument as their own: both Louis Hartz and Richard Hofstadter
employed it in their efforts to explain the course of American reform . . . . Political scientists,
too, submitted to it.").
98 See Joyce Appleby, The Social Originsof American Revolutionary Ideology, 64 J. AM.

Hisr. 935, 956 (1978).
99 See CHILTON WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN SUITRAGE FROM PROPERTY TO DEMOCRACY

1760-1860, 5 (1960) ("Generally speaking, political theorists, particularly of the eighteenth
century, agreed that the freeholder should comprise the bulk of the electorate of governments
with a democratic element.").
10o Id. at 3.
ior Id.

102 Id. at 6-7.
103 Id. at 10.
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allowed to vote.10 4 In the colonies, one of the proprietors of West Jersey
expressed a similar theory: "Those persons are fittest to be trusted with
choosing and being legislators who have a fixed, valuable and permanent
interest in lands." 0 5 The intellectual tradition therefore sprang from a
society that conceived a limited franchise based on property
qualifications.
However, in the years leading up to the American Revolution, the
American colonies underwent a period of striking economic growth, 10 6
leading to increased landholding among colonists. As a result of this
pervasive eighteenth-century colonial landholding, the electorate fundamentally changed. 10 7 Property restrictions did not heavily restrict the average colonist's ability to participate politically because a colonist could
easily obtain land.' 0 8 The colonial electorate therefore was proportionately larger than it was in seventeenth-century Britain.109 In 1772, Benjamin Franklin proudly claimed that every New Englander was a
freeholder. I 0 Although this was surely an "exaggeration pardonable in a
man who was traveling abroad," his statement contains an element of
truth:'" the size of the colonial electorate was categorically different
from seventeenth-century Britain.
Moreover, the commercial transformation of the colonial economy
in the eighteenth century politicized the colonial electorate by adding
broad economic concerns into politics.1 2 During the middle decades of
the eighteenth century, American colonists from all walks of life became
infected with "new economic ambitions."1 13 Possessing strong affinities
to Adam Smith's view of economic life, the individualist definition of
freedom was interjected into national politics. 14 Madisonian politics
adopted this viewpoint and argued that the public good emerged from
104 See id. at 64 ("He that is here today, and gone tomorrow, I do not see that he hath such
a permanent interest.").
105 Appleby, supra note 98, at 949.
106 See CHUTE, supra note 47, at 161-62.
107 See id.
108 Id. at 162.
109 See id.
110 Id.
Ill Id. at 162.

112 See Appleby, supra note 98, at 950 ("Economic issues almost always became political
ones. As community after community became embroiled in factional disputes the inner spring
of profit and power came under the scrutiny of the plain members of society. Awareness of
the self-interested response of elite officeholders sapped the moral base of deference in the

colonies, but it also suggested a commonality upon which a new political system might be
built.").
113 Id. at 949.
114 See id. at 949-51.
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free competition and the private pursuit of gain."t 5 On the other hand,
Hamilton argued against this economic notion:
There are some, who maintain, that trade will regulate
itself, and is not to be benefitted by the encouragements,
or restraints of government. Such persons will imagine,
that there is no need of a common directing power. This
is one of those wild speculative paradoxes, which have
grown into credit among us, contrary to the uniform
practice and sense of the most enlightened nations.' 16
These competing visions demonstrate that some colonists now believed
economic issues were a part of politics.
Reflecting an enlarged electorate and new concerns over the economic order, the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 included "broad suffrage, a unicameral legislature, and annual elections."1 7 Nevertheless,
even its most radical members believed that property remained an important element of the franchise." 8 Rather than do away with property qualifications, radicals proposed that the state discourage large
concentrations of wealth because the accumulation of large amounts of
property "is dangerous to the Rights, and destructive of the Common
Happiness of Mankind."' 19 Moreover, during the constitutional convention, the Committee of Detail suggested that "the qualifications of the
electors shall be the same . . . as those of the electors in several states, of

the most numerous branch of their own legislature, that is to say the
lower house." 20 When the committee suggested leaving the voting qualification up to the states, no state entirely divorced property qualifications from voting.121
Given the fundamental changes happening to the colonial electorate
over the seventeenth and eighteenth century, why were property qualifications maintained? Some historians have posited that the founders
wanted to limit political diversity.122 For example, Chute argued that a
property qualification demonstrated that although most Americans could
tolerate religious diversity, few Americans would have seriously suggested that political diversity was tolerable.123 Others have contended
that the colonists maintained property qualifications because private
property developed the social, moral, and political qualities necessary to
115 See Foner, supra note 94, at 8.

116 Appleby, supra note 98, at 956.
117 Foner, supra note 94, at 9.
118 See id.
119 Id.

120 CHUTE, supra note 47, at 252.
121 WILLIAMSON, supra note 99, at 135.
122 See CHUTE, supra note 47, at 163.
123 Id.
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democratic citizenship.124 Nevertheless, under both historical theories,
property qualification was the backbone of meaningful political
participation.
Current solutions to CIC restrictions should therefore adequately address one or both of these theories because history demonstrates the universal interest at stake: the connection between property rights and
meaningful political participation. Consequently, a solution that analyzes how CICs affect political participation might suggest why other
solutions do not adequately address homogenization or Balkanization
problems and posit a better solution.
2.

The Founders' Rationale For Private Property

This Note's historical analysis also contends that the founders maintained no singular rationale for connecting private property and political
participation. Although progressive historians have argued that Lockean
emphasis on private property captured the revolutionary spirit of the
founders, 125 new research has suggested a "more complex and atavistic
intellectual tradition growing out of the right English intellectual traditions of the Dissenters, radical Whigs, Classical republicans, commonwealthmen, country party, or more simply the opposition." 2 6
Therefore, authoritative historiographies that argue the founders universally believed in classical liberalism when discussing private property
systems can no longer dominate a historical approach to conceptualizing
property systems.127 The historical reality is more complex and reflects
numerous ideologies, which ossified only after framing the
constitution. 128
Republican 29 politics reflected one primary rationale for private
property systems.13 0 The republican commitment to self-government
124 See Appleby, supra note 98, at 956 ("Encoded as it was in a gloss on English history,
it could provoke only resistance, but the American Revolution developed its revolutionary
character not by redeeming the rights of Englishmen, but by denying English sovereignty and
the conceptual order which tied liberty to the English constitution."); Foner, supra note 94, at
II ("[I]t was simply the livelihood of the farmer but his social, moral, and political qualities
which made the yeoman the basis of Jeffersonian republicanism.").
125 See Appleby, supra note 98, at 935.
126 Id.
127 See id. at 935-38.

128 See Foner, supra note 94, at 13.
129 I use republican here not to refer to the current Republican Party or its ideology, but
classical republican political theory.
130 See Foner, supra note 94, at 11 ("Jefferson perceived self-sufficient farming as the
surest basis for republican independence and virtue. Like so many Americans of the era,
Jefferson distrusted large cities with their population of wealthy nonproducers and dependent,
impoverished laborers. Thus . . . as Leo Marx argues, it was simply the livelihood of the
farmer but his social, moral, and political qualities which made the yeoman the basis of Jeffersonian republicanism.").
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rested on a belief that the basis of independence was real property ownership.131 In other words, political liberty springs from the independence
of the individual. Republicans were passionately averse to debt and
credit because debt and credit enmeshed individuals in a web of dependence.1 3 2 They believed that self-sufficient farming was the surest basis
for republican independence and virtue, which led Jefferson to argue that
society had a responsibility to promote the widest diffusion of landed
property.' 3 3 "Where uncultivated land and poverty coexisted . . . the

natural right of all men to a portion of the land had been violated." 34
Jeffersonian republicans believed that private property developed the social, moral, and political qualities necessary for political participation.' 3 5
In other words, only free men that could place constitutional duties above
private concern could be trusted to exercise their political rights.' 3 6
Federalism embodied another way to conceptualize politics and
property. Hamilton insisted that government should give free rein to the
competition of conflicting interests rather than stifle competition in the
pursuit of a unitary good.' 37 However, federalists did insist on an elaborate system of checks and balances that ensured protection against the
tyranny of the majority. In The Federalist,Paper Number Ten, Madison
wrote,
To secure the public good and private rights against the
danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is
then the great object to which our inquiries are directed.

. .

. The federal Constitution forms a happy com-

bination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests
being referred to the national, the local, and particular to
the state legislatures.138
The federalists solved their growing concern about political diversity and
factions by allowing the states to determine which of its citizens were
eligible to vote.139 As stated above, the founders had two theories at
131 See id.
132 Id.
'33 Id.
'34 Id.

135

Id.

Appleby, supra note 98, at 938.
137 See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 57 (Alexander Hamilton) (1961) ("It is in vain to say
136

that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all
subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm.").
138 THE FEDERAIST No. 10, at 57-60 (James Madison) (1961).
139 See CHUTE, supra note 47, at 252.
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their disposal: the federalist concept of constitutional balances and the
republican concept of civic virtue.140
These two popular theories connecting private property and political
participation now resemble the current debate between communitarianism and pluralism. The Jeffersonian commitment to creating citizens
able to place constitutional interests above private ones bear resemblance
to a communitarian rationale, which emphasizes that group identity is
intrinsically valuable to the human experience. 14 1 The federalist emphasis on creating an arena to argue over competing goods bear resemblance
to a pluralist rationale that emphasizes participation through the collective articulation of individual preferences.14 2 Not only do modem private property debates resemble those debates which occurred over two
hundred years ago, the current debate also utilizes similar words,
phrases, and concepts that make the founders' debate comprehensible to
the modem day observer. 143
However, despite the founders' two theories, the narrative is not so
simple. Both federalists and republicans were still largely formulating
how to think about property rights and the franchise within a revolutionary construct.l4" As a result, there were no ardent pluralists who believed that laissez-faire property rights created the best political
system.s45 Nor were there any pure communitarians who emphasized
that the collective interest should always trump the individual interest
regarding property rights.146 In other words, neither federalists nor
republicans articulated an economic system that the Constitution should
support.147 A historical analysis therefore demonstrates that the founders
did not attach themselves purely to either pluralist or communitarian
values.
Nevertheless, this Note's historical discussion of the property rights
makes no normative claim that the founders' solved our problems. However, the historical discussion is important for two reasons. First, the
founders' debate highlights some issues which are still present in the CIC
140 See Appleby, supra note 98, at 955.
141 See Richard Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1344-45 (1992-1993)

("[C]ommunitarians doubt if humans can flourish in atomized social environments. Communitarians value multi-stranded and enduring social relationships, something that group ownership of land can plausibly be thought to foster.").
142 See Alexander, supra note 7 ("The theory of interest-group pluralism and its cognate,
public-choice theory, in their normative moments seek to secure for social groups a strong
form of autonomy from collective intervention.").
143 See SAVIGNY, supra note 83, at 131-32
144 See Appleby, supra note 98, at 955-56.
145 See id.
146 See id.

147 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("But a
constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism
and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire.").
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debate and that we would not have otherwise noticed. Second, it demonstrates that current frustration with CIC regulations is far from novel.
Thus, these historical rationales for private property systems should be
incorporated into any modern solution, not because they are strictly necessary but rather because communitarian and pluralist perspectives offer
helpful ways to conceptualize the problem and construct an agreeable
solution.
III.

CURRENT DOCTRINES AND WHAT THEY MISS

Before proceeding, a summary of the discussion thus far is in order.
First, the founders evidenced a universal interest in the interaction between property rights and meaningful political participation. Thus, any
solution to CIC restrictions must keep this universal interest in mind.
Second, a modern debate should include both republican and federalist
ideals because, whether cognizant or not of the historical foundations, the
scholar entered a debate which began a long ago. Thus, by engaging
with federalist pluralism and republican communitarianism, the scholar
does not overlook potential solutions to problematic CIC restrictions.
A. Judicial Enforcement as State Action
One potential solution to the problem of CIC restrictions is to apply
the state action doctrine. The Supreme Court first raised this question in
Shelly v. Kraemer.148 In that case, the African-American petitioners purchased property subject to a racially restrictive covenant.149 The covenant declared that the property could not be "occupied by any person not
of the Caucasian race, it being intended hereby to restrict the use of said
property . . . against the occupancy as owners or tenants of any portion of

said property for resident or other purpose by people of the Negro or
Mongolian race."' 5 0 Respondents, owners of another property in the
community, brought suit in an attempt to restrain the petitioners from
taking possession.' 5 ' The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply because the restrictive covenant was the
product of private agreement.1 52
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and held that the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants based
on race or national origin.153 The court stated that the Fourteenth
Amendment was designed to protect "the right to acquire, enjoy, own
148 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
149 Id. at 4.
150 Id. at 9-10.
151 See id. at 6.
152 See id.
153 See id. at 19.
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and dispose of property,"l 54 and that petitioners were denied these rights
with the "clearand unmistakable imprimaturof the State."' 5 5 The Court
further asserted that, "it has been the consistent ruling of this Court that
the action of the States to which the Amendment has reference includes
action of state courts and state judicial officials."' 5 6
Despite the Court's holding, a state-action solution presents difficulties because it fails to engage both federalist pluralism and republican
communitarianism. First, Shelley v. Kraemer only raised the question of
judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants.' 57 Because the Supreme Court has yet to decide another restrictive covenant case on the
basis of state action, lower courts disagree on the limits of state action.' 58
Even if the state action doctrine applied only when CICs violate equal
protection rights, constitutionally protected groups are limited.' 5 9 Further, the state action doctrine cannot remedy more systemic forms of
segregation and exclusion because equal protection requires a discriminatory purpose.' 60 Thus, the state action doctrine would not go far
enough under a republican communitarian theory because CICs can still
restrict non-protected groups, unintentionally exclude protected groups,
and prohibit valuable political speech.161 The state action doctrine does
not engage republican communitarianism because it fails to create a
workable standard that distinguishes which groups and speech deserve
legal protection.
Second, if all constitutional provisions applied under the state action
doctrine, the restrictions could potentially go too far. For example, due
process protections may void beneficial and innocuous HOA regulations,
I54 Id. at 10.

155 Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
156 Id. at 18.

157 See id. at 8 ("Whether the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment inhibits judicial enforcement by state courts of restrictive covenants based on race or color is a
question which this Court has not heretofore been called upon to consider.").
158 See, e.g., Gerber v. Longboat Harbour N. Condo. Inc., 757 F. Supp. 1339 (M.D. Fla.
1991) ("[J]udicial enforcement of private agreements contained in a declaration of condominium constitutes state action and brings the heretofore private conduct within the scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment, through which the First Amendment guarantee of free speech is made
applicable to the states."); Goldberg v. 400 E. Ohio Condo. Ass'n, 12 F. Supp. 2d 820, 823
(N.D. Ill. 1998) ("We think the better view is that there is no state action inherent in the
possible future state court enforcement of a private property agreement. Put another way,
Gerber is not good law." (citation omitted)).
159 See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (race); Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356 (1886) (race, color, or national origin); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (gender); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (sexual orientation).
160 See SPADE, supra note 72.

t61 See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (holding that speech regulations are valid so long as "ample alternative channels for communication" exist).
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such as restrictions on architectural style.162 Applying all constitutional
provisions, through a state action lens, might unduly restrict our ability to
foster and preserve our differences that check majoritarian impulses. 163
Thus, the state action doctrine cannot adequately address the problems of

CIC restrictions.
B.

Performing Government Functions

Another potential solution suggests that CICs essentially perform
government functions and should therefore be subjected to the same
types of restrictions as local governments. The Supreme Court raised
this question in Marsh v. Alabama.I6 In that case, the Gulf Shipbuilding
Corporation owned the town of Chickasaw, Alabama.1 65 A Chickasaw
deputy sheriff requested that the appellant, a Jehovah's Witness, cease
distributing her religious literature without a permit and to leave the
company premises. 166 Appellant refused, and was arrested and charged
under Title 14, § 426 of the 1940 Alabama Code which criminalized
"enter[ing] or remain[ing] on the premises of another after having been
warned not to do so."167 Appellant contended that the town's prohibition
violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.16 8 The court stated
that "[t]he more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for
use by the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it."169
Therefore, the Court subjected the town to the same restrictions as local
governments because the private town performed so many municipal
functions that the town became indistinguishable from a local
government.170
162 See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Issaquah, 851 P.2d 744 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (holding
that even though aesthetic designs are an appropriate component of land use governance, the
building design provisions of the municipal code were unconstitutionally vague). In other
words, applying the state action doctrine might disallow vagueness in situations where it might
be beneficial. For example, what if the CC&R said no pink houses? This would not be considered vague. The problem with this, however, is that the state action doctrine encourages
communities to create specific CC&Rs, which can only be overridden by a supermajority .
Instead, if we encourage HOAs to make these decisions on an ad hoc basis, architectural styles
can change with the times and be subject to an ongoing political conversation rather than
permanently encouraging communities to dictate changing aesthetic choices.
163

See DE TOCQUEVuE, supra note II, at 310 ("The second [circumstance leading to

contribution to the maintenance of a democratic-republic] consists in those township institutions which limit the despotism of the majority and at the same time impart to the people a
taste for freedom and the art of being free.").
164 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
165 Id. at 502.
166 Id. at 503.
167 Id. at 503-04.
168 Id. at 504.
169 Id. at 506.
170

See id. at 507-09.
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Nonetheless, a solution based on Marsh v. Alabama inadequately
addresses the problem associated with CIC restriction for two reasons.
First, similar to a state action doctrine solution, constitutional provisions
are both under- and over-inclusive. Second, not all CICs resemble municipalities to the same degree as the town in Marsh v. Alabama."'
Even if the doctrine expands to encompass CICs performing some government functions, it fails to regulate many smaller CICs. Thus, a "performing government functions" 72 solution cannot adequately address
homogenization and Balkanization problems.
C.

Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co.: The "Sufficiently Close Nexus"
Test

Another potential solution to CIC restrictions suggest that CICs bear
a "sufficiently close nexus" to the state and should therefore be subject to
the same types of limitations as local governments. In Jackson v. Metro.
Edison Co., a privately held utility company terminated the plaintiff's
electricity service.17 3 The plaintiff claimed that the utility company violated her procedural due process rights when it failed to provide adequate
notice or any hearing with regard to the termination of her electricity.174
The plaintiff argued that because the electrical company terminated her
electricity for "alleged nonpayment, [an] action allowed by a provision
of its general tariff filed with the Commission" that the company's action
constituted a state action.' 7 5 The Court rejected her argument and held
that due process rights only apply when "there is a sufficiently close
nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity
so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State
itself."' 7 6
A "sufficiently close nexus" solution would be even less workable
than the previous two solutions. First, similar to a solution under the
state action doctrine, constitutional provisions are both under- and overinclusive. Second, and more importantly, very few CICs actually bear a
"sufficiently close nexus to the state."' 7 7 Undoubtedly, the state is involved in the creation of CICs;s7 8 however, none of these actions bears
any greater nexus to the state than the private utility company in Jackson.
171 See id. at 502 ("The property consists of residential buildings, streets, a system of
sewers, a sewage disposal plant and a "business block" on which business places are
situated.").
172 See Chadderdon, supra note 17, at 255.

173 See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 347 (1974).
174 See id. at 348.
175 Id.

176 Id. at 350-51.
177 See id.
178 State law controls CIC creation and the types of activities CICs are allowed to create.
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In fact, a state-controlled monopoly is arguably subject to more state
control than are CICs.17 9 Thus, a "sufficiently close nexus" solution cannot adequately address problematic CIC restrictions because too few
CICs will bear a sufficiently close nexus to the state.
D.

Reasonableness Standard of Review

Gregory Alexander supports a reasonableness standard of review.
And, outside of the narrow confines of protected classes, courts have
tended to review CIC restrictions under a reasonableness standard of review.'s 0 For example, the Supreme Court of California upheld pet restrictions contained in the CC&R of a condominium complex. 18'
Although the court believed that the restrictions were unreasonable when
specifically applied to the homeowner, the general restrictions on cat and
dog ownership were generally reasonable.1 82 In New Jersey, the superior
court adopted the reasonableness standard of review when passing on the
validity of a CIC restriction preventing tier three sex offenders from living in the community.183 In Florida, a court upheld as reasonable a
CC&R that restricted occupancy to persons over sixteen years of age.184
Alexander cogently argues that 'standards' for evaluating these restrictions are preferable to 'rules' because "standards set out the message
that the question is never closed."' 8 5 Nevertheless, the current reasonableness standard of review is insufficient for two reasons. First, as the
dissent in Nahrstedt makes clear, the concept of reasonableness is subject
to substantial disagreement.18 6 Although a restriction might be reasonable under a pluralist rationale, other communitarian values might be lost.
Therefore, before settling on a reasonableness standard of review, this
"reasonableness" must encompass specific values.
Second, unless reasonableness implies an external community standard, courts will uphold most rules as reasonable for the purpose of the
internal community, depriving dissenters within and without the group of
See Chadderdon, supra note 17, at 255.
See Alexander, supra note 7, at 6.
181 See Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1292 (Cal. 1994).
182 Id.
183 See Mulligan v. Panther Valley Prop. Owners Ass'n, 766 A.2d 1186, 1190 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
184 See Rocek v. Markowitz, 492 So. 2d 460, 461 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
185 See Alexander, supra note 7, at 56.
186 See Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1292-1293 (Arabian, J., dissenting) ("Beyond dispute,
human beings have long enjoyed an abiding and cherished association with their household
animals. Given the substantial benefits derived from pet ownership, the undue burden on the
use of property imposed on condominium owners who can maintain pets within the confines of
their units without creating a nuisance or disturbing the quiet enjoyment of others substantially
outweighs whatever meager utility the restriction may serve in the abstract.").
179
180
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the laudable opportunity to "continuously attack its boundaries."1 87 Although Alexander argues that reasonableness should and does encompass
external values, recent decisions suggest otherwise.188 Because courts
can examine only the factual record between the litigants, courts have
difficulty analyzing how regulations affect the external community. 189
Specific fundamental values must therefore be included in the reasonableness standard of review to help guide judicial decisions. The current
reasonableness standard of review fails to tackle the problem that individuals within CICs will lack the "capacity to develop sympathy for
others and thereby contradict the communitarian ideal itself."1 90
IV.

A

NEW SOLUTION

A. Locating a Right to Heterogeneous Communities
Because the current proposed solutions to CIC restrictions do not
address the consequences of political participation or the role of federalist pluralism and republican communitarianism, this Note uses its historical analysis to suggest what value is missing from current solutions:
meaningful political participation.
The right to vote is an essential element of democracy. A broad
franchise yields a political system that allows ultimate power be distributed among many.191 However, a broad franchise is a necessary but not
a sufficient condition for a well-functioning political system. Other elements must be in place, "including (but not limited to) freedom to organize politically, institutions that facilitate political choice, a politically
aware voting population, and above all, citizens who vote."' 92 This is
exactly the balance both federalist pluralists and Jeffersonian communitarians sought to achieve by limiting the franchise to citizens of
property. Thus, the founders were concerned with more than just the
ability to participate in the political process; the founders intended that
political participation be meaningful. 19 3
Because restricting the franchise to property owners can no longer
be justified, history helps provide a framework for incorporating this fundamental goal of meaningful political participation. The founders rea187 See Alexander, supra note 7, at 58.
188 See, e.g., Mulligan, 766 A.2d at 1192. ("We do not know from the record how many

common interest communities exist within the State and we do not know from the record how
many of those communities have seen fit to adopt comparable restrictions and whether they
have determined to include a broader group than Tier 3 registrants.").
189 Id.
190 Alexander, supra note 7, at 52.
191 DONALi) GRIER STEPHENSON, JR., THE RIGHT TO VOTE: RIGHTS AN) LIBERTIES UNDER
THE LAW 1 (2004).
192 Id.

193 See Appleby, supra note 98, at 956.
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soned that our federalist system should encourage experimentation and
self-government.1 9 4 In The Federalist Number 10, Madison argued that
federalism makes it "less probable that a majority of the whole will have
a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a
common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to
discover their own strength." 1 95 The concept of laboratories of democracy derives from Justice Brandeis' dissenting opinion in New Ice Co. v.
Liebmann.19 6 He argued, "[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as
a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk
to the rest of the country." 9 7 In other words, because the best solution is
not always clear, a federalist system allows local governments to explore
various solutions so that the most practical outcome prevails.' 9 8
The Court has recognized the federalist concept of "laboratories of
democracy" as a fundamental right enshrined in the Tenth Amendment.199 In United States v. Lopez, the Court stated:
While it is doubtful that any State, or indeed any reasonable person, would argue that it is wise policy to allow
students to carry guns on school premises, considerable
disagreement exists about how best to accomplish that
goal. In this circumstance, the theory and utility of our
federalism are revealed, for the States may perform their
role as laboratoriesfor experimentation to devise various solutions where the best solution is far from clear. 20
The Court has also asserted that laboratories of democracy enable greater
political participation because federalism involves decision making at the
local level. 20 1 Therefore, one particular value that should be kept in
mind when evaluating CIC restrictions is the federalist concept of laboratories of democracy.
However, to take the laboratories of democracy rationale seriously,
the vision of our communities must also be taken seriously. In addition
to recognizing a need for laboratories of democracy, we must also ensure
that our communities are exposed to diverse viewpoints. Homogenous
communities are prone to the psychological phenomenon of groupthink,
194 See Madison, supra note 138.
'95

Id. at 60.

196 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).
'97

Id.

198 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995).
199 U.S. CONST. amend. X, § 1. ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people."); see Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581.
200 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581.
201 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1972).
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which undermines the rationale for experimentation. 202 Without the
moderating effects of exposure to different value systems, members of
the community radically restrict their ability for moderation because alternate viewpoints, outside of those accepted as tolerable, are not addressed. Thus, for political participation under a federalist system to be
meaningful, we need communities roughly as diverse as our political
body because citizens must be able to engage in a national rather than
local dialogue. 203 Members of each community should be encouraged to
confront the larger community's disparate beliefs and value systems because the federalist experiment was designed for adaptation and adoption. 204 Considering how CIC restrictions affect diversity within the
community prevents unproductive experimentation.
As a result, this Note suggests that the federalist emphasis on laboratories of democracy should be combined with the republican emphasis
on civic virtue to ensure that the vision of our communities is taken seriously. The republican commitment to self-government rested on a belief
that real property ownership was the basis of independence. 205 Under
the republican theory, political participation required members of the political body to be possessed with civic virtue-the ability to place constitutional duties above private concerns. 206 Although the means to achieve
the virtues of citizenship have changed over the last two hundred years,
the goal that members of our society possess the ability to place constitutional duties above private concerns remains the same. 207
Diversity provides a novel means to achieve this fundamental goal.
It has been recognized as a compelling government interest in constitutional jurisprudence. 208 For largely the same reasons that diversity is
202 See Sunstein, supra note 48, at 113-14. Although not exposed to modem day psychology theory, Alexander Hamilton noted the beneficial effects of tempering extremes
through exposure to different ideas in the Federalist Papers. See THE FEDERALIST' No. 70, at
458 (Alexander Hamilton) (1961) ("The differences of opinion, and the jarring of parties in
[the legislative] department of the government . . . often promote deliberation and circumspection, and serve to check the excesses in the majority.").
203 See Alexander, supra note 7, at 52-54.

204 Id. at 54-55. ("As the basic framework for communities, pluralism implies that a multiplicity of diverse communities must be allowed to exist so that the good remains subject to
reformulation through continual public conversations among the groups."); G. Alan Tarr, Laboratories of Democracy? Brandeis, Federalism, and Scientific Management, 31 Puimlius 37,

38 (2001).
205 See Foner, supra note 94, at 11.
206 See Appleby, supra note 98, at 938.
207 See JORGEN HAnERMAS,

BETWEEN

FACTS

AND

NORMS:

CONTRIBUTIONS

COURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 110 (William Rehg trans., 1992).

TO A Dis-

Habermas has

argued the democracy requires the assent (Zustimmung) of all citizens involved in a discursive
process. Democratic legitimacy therefore rests on the ability of citizens to debate the common
good and acknowledge each citizens status as an equal.
208 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331-32 (2003) ("In addition to the expert

studies and reports entered into evidence at trial, numerous studies show that student body
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crucial to the university's mission to serve the common good, heterogeneous residential communities are essential to democracy. Diverse communities make the best laboratories of democracy because diversity
promotes the civic virtues of classical republicanism. As Ben Franklin
suggested, "when you assemble a number of men to have the advantage
of their joint wisdom, you inevitably assemble with those men all their
prejudices, their passions, their errors of opinion, their local interests, and
their selfish views." 209 Although appeals to personal interest should not
be wholly avoided, democracy requires that members deliberate and offer rationales that appeal to the common good.2 1 0 Heterogeneous communities help approximate this deliberative ideal by avoiding the
concentration of prejudices within our laboratories.
Similar to genetic diversity, diversity within our communities serves
as a way for those communities to adapt to changing environments. Diversity makes it more likely that some communities will possess attributes that are suited for the rapid transformation of our political and social
culture. Recognizing the need for heterogeneous laboratories of democracy would ensure meaningful political participation and limit restrictions, which exclude some members of our society from participating in
internal group life.
B.

Incorporating the Right to Heterogeneous Communities Into the
Current Reasonableness Standard of Review

The debate on what constitutes a reasonable CIC restriction will be
more profitable if the fundamental right to heterogeneous communities is
incorporated into the current reasonableness standard of review. Judicial
reasonableness review will achieve balance because it will deny communal autonomy strong enough to be unnecessarily exclusive, but also allow each community to develop some of its own standards. 2 11 In other
diversity promotes learning outcomes, and 'better prepares students for an increasingly diverse
workforce and society, and better prepares them as professionals. These benefits are not theoretical but real, as major American businesses have made clear that the skills needed in today's
increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse
people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints. What is more, high-ranking retired officers and civilian leaders of the United States military assert that, '[b]ased on [their] decades of experience,'
a 'highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps . . . is essential to the military's ability to
fulfill its principle[sic]mission to provide national security.'") (citations omitted).
209 CHUTE, supra note 47, at 255.
210 See EAMONN CALLAN, CREATING

CITIZENS: POLITICAL EDUCATION AN)

LInERAi DE-

26 (1997) ("In exhibiting reciprocity, I begin by putting before you what I take to be
fair. But I must also be ready to seriously discuss the opposing proposals that you take in the
hope of moving, through the discipline of dialogue, toward a common perspective that each of
us could adhere to in good conscience. Your viewpoint is as good as mine to the fulfillment of
that hope, and only through emphatic identification with your viewpoint can I appreciate what
MOCRAcy

reason might commend in what you say.").
211 See Alexander, supra note 7, at 60.
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words, the community will be able to join the conversation with the court
to consider each question of diversity anew. 2 12 Moreover, because reasonableness is an open-ended question, there is no bright-line requirement for how diverse a community should be. Courts can also consider
new types of diversity-diversity outside of constitutionally protected
groups. Therefore, incorporating the value of heterogeneous laboratories
of democracy "progressively reiterates and reinforces the ideal of
community." 2 13
Incorporating a right to heterogeneous laboratories of democracy
into a reasonableness standard of review eliminates another problem: if
courts required every community to be a microcosm of our nation, experimentation would be less likely and less fruitful. However, because diversity would only be one factor considered when reviewing whether or
not CIC restrictions are reasonable, courts would not require perfect diversity-only that our communities are reasonably heterogeneous. Including this fundamental right in a reasonableness standard of review
achieves a balance not currently available under any scholarly solution to
CIC regulations. Recognizing a right to heterogeneous communities provides the much-needed guidance for courts to analyze how CIC restrictions affect our sense of community.
CONCLUSION

In the Gettysburg Address, Abraham Lincoln best articulated the
core values of the American experiment: "that government of the people,
by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth." 2 14 A gated
suburbia jeopardizes the cause to which the "honored dead . . . gave
their last fill measure of devotion." 2 15 A government "of the people"
includes all its members. A government "by the people" requires that its
members be afforded equal opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking process. Homogenous communities shelter their members from
the outside world and blind them to the common good. A government
"for the people" cannot stand unless its members deliberate about the
common good and arrive at decisions acceptable to all. By appealing to
a historical discussion of property rights and political participation, this
212 See id.
213 See id.

214 The full quote reads: "It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us, that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which
they here gave the last full measure of devotion; that we here highly resolve that these dead
shall not have died in vain; that the nation shall, under God, have a new birth of freedom, and
that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth."
President Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), in Lois J. EINHORN, AnRAHAM LINCOLN THE ORATOR: PENETRATING THE LINCOLN LiEGEND 177, 177 (1992).
215 Id.
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Note seeks to avoid the recent disintegration of the American social
fabric attributable to CIC exclusionary practices.
A solution to the current skyboxification of American life lies in
realizing that the founders devised a system to protect self-rule rather
than property rights. The founders designed laboratories of democracy
to encourage meaningful political participation. However, laboratories
of democracy alone cannot solve the problem because federalist pluralism provides no guidance for the laboratory's composition. To provide
more guidance, a republican emphasis on civic virtue was added to recognize a right to heterogeneous communities. The best solution to problematic CIC restrictions recognizes a right to diversity under a
reasonableness standard of review. Although this solution alone cannot
protect against the disintegration of the American social fabric, preventing CICs from legally and permanently altering the formation of community life in calamitous ways helps to ensure that our "government of the
people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth." 216

216 Id.

